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I. INTRODUCTION
Hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil.' According to one interpre-
tation, this ancient adage solemnly warns that those who are exposed to
wrongdoing are more likely to engage in it themselves. Today, the Peo-
ple's Republic of China (PRC) embraces a similar philosophy for blot-
ting out evil, as evidenced by its steady crackdown on Internet content.
2
In fact, since President Hu Jintao came to power in 2003, Chinese gov-
ernment authorities have taken many steps to control and suppress politi-
cal and religious speech on the Internet.3 The government's efforts have
resulted in the world's most advanced system of Internet censorship and
surveillance, supported by tens of thousands of employees and extensive
corporate and private sector cooperation, including that of several U.S.
technology companies.4
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1. The origin of this maxim is disputed, though there is evidence to suggest it
originated in China during the eighth century. Wikipedia, Three Wise Monkeys,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Threewisemonkeys (last visited Nov. 13, 2007).
2. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "RACE TO THE BOTTOM" CORPORATE COMPLICITY IN CHINESE
INTERNET CENSORSHIP 3 (2006), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/china0806/.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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But whatever happened to do no evil? Or more ironically, what
about don't be evil,5 the bold company motto of Google, one U.S. com-
pany that actively participates in Chinese Internet censorship? 6 In Janu-
ary 2006, Google launched Google.cn, a censored search engine for its
Chinese users. 7  The site filters thousands of keywords and web ad-
dresses, 8 including politically-sensitive content related to Tiananmen
Square, Tibet, and the government-banned spiritual movement Falun
Gong.9
Unfortunately, Google is not the only U.S. Internet company to
compromise its users' freedom of expression in order to tap into the lu-
crative Chinese market.' ° Yahoo! and Microsoft have also created Chi-
nese-version search engines and engage in active self-censorship. 1 In
addition, Yahoo! has provided Chinese authorities with private, confi-
dential information about its users, resulting in the convictions of at least
two Chinese journalists.
12
All three companies defend their actions by insisting that, despite
the constraints, they are helping to increase access to information in
China. 13 Their collective justification is that limited information is better
than no information at all.14 In response to criticism, Yahoo! rationalized
that it "can make more of a difference by having even a limited presence
and growing our influence, than . ..by not operating in a particular
5. AMNESTY INT'L, UNDERMINING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN CHINA: THE ROLE OF
YAHOO!, MICROSOFT AND GOOGLE 20 (2006).
6. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 5.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 55.
9. Clive Thompson, Google's China Problem (and China's Google Problem),
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 64, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/23/magazine/23google.html.
10. William Thatcher Dowell, The Internet, Censorship, and China, 7 GEORGETOWN J. INT'L
AFF. 111, 112 (2006). In 1993, an estimated 2,000 Chinese had access to the Internet. By 2005,
more than 94,000,000 Chinese were regularly connecting to the Internet. China represents the
world's second largest personal computer market and has the world's third largest number of per-
sonal computer owners. The Chinese e-commerce market is expected to reach $6.5 billion by 2007.
Id. at 113.
11. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 5. In May 2005, Microsoft's new joint venture
portal users found they could not use the Chinese words for "democracy," "freedom," "human
rights," or "demonstration" to mark personal websites created through MSN Spaces, a free online
blog service. The resulting error message announced, "This item contains forbidden speech." Hu-
man Rights and the Internet-The People's Republic of China: Testimony Before the Cong. Human
Rights Caucus, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Testimony] (statement of Tom Malinowski, Wash-
ington Advocacy Director, Human Rights Watch).
12. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 5.
13. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 6.
14. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 5.
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country at all."15 Microsoft and Google have adopted a similar line of
defense.' 6 In addition, the companies insist they have no choice but to
comply with local laws and regulations if they are to operate in the Chi-
nese market.
17
These arguments, however, have failed to shield Google, Microsoft,
and Yahoo! from intense criticism, both at home and abroad. Human
rights advocates, the U.S. government, the European Union, and numer-
ous nongovernmental organizations have blasted the companies for being
complicit and caving to the PRC's demands.' 8 These concerns eventu-
ally prompted the U.S. House of Representatives to hold a joint commit-
tee hearing at which top executives from the corporations were called to
testify about their business practices in China. 19 The following day, Rep-
resentative Christopher Smith, a New Jersey Republican, introduced the
Global Online Freedom Act of 2006.20 While this legislation expired at
the end of the congressional session, Rep. Smith re-introduced the bill
the following year as the Global Online Freedom Act of 2007 (the Act).2'
The Act promotes freedom of expression on the Internet by prohib-
iting U.S. businesses from cooperating with officials in Internet-
restricting countries. 22 While the Act should be commended for impos-
ing a higher standard of ethical business practices on U.S. corporations,
there are significant problems with curing China's censorship policies by
imposing liability on U.S. Internet companies. The standards and rec-
ommendations proposed by Congress within the Act correspond with an
inherently American conception of freedom of expression. Thus, the Act
imposes our domestic standards, rooted in the First Amendment, on
states with very different political ideologies. A better alternative for
addressing China's crackdown on free speech would be to create an in-
dustry-wide code of conduct.
Part II of this Comment discusses the legal and technological infra-
structures employed by the Chinese government to regulate Internet con-
tent and activity. Part III examines the complicity of U.S. corporations
and possible means of holding them accountable. Part IV discusses the
specific provisions of the Act, and Part V assesses whether it amounts to
15. Sumner Lemon, Update: Amnesty International Blasts Google, Yahoo, Microsoft,
INFOWORLD, July 20, 2006, http://www.infoworld.com/article/06/07/20/HNamnestyblasts-I.html.
16. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 6; Google Defends Cooperation with China,
MSNBC, Apr. 12, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12283735.
17. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 7.
18. Id. at 6.
19. Id. at 4.
20. Global Online Freedom Act of 2006, H.R. 4780, 109th Cong. (2006).
21. Global Online Freedom Act of 2007, H.R. 275, 110th Cong. (2007).
22. Id. pmbl.; see also Libby George, CQ Bill Analysis HR 4780- Global Online Freedom Act
of 2006, CONG. Q., July 14, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 12363460.
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an extraterritorial application of the First Amendment. Part VI addresses
policy reasons that weigh against the Act and, finally, Part VII offers
alternative solutions and recommendations.
II. CHINA'S LEGAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL
ROADBLOCKS TO FREE SPEECH
The PRC relies on a combination of technology and legislation to
sustain its comprehensive censorship and surveillance program.23 As the
number of Internet users in China skyrockets,24 and as these users de-
velop expertise in accessing information online, the Chinese government
devotes extraordinary resources to maintain a nationwide firewall.25
Dubbed "The Great Firewall of China," this advanced filtering sys-
tem enables Chinese officials to regulate the movement of information
between the global Internet and the Chinese Internet.26 Forbidden key-
words and websites are filtered at the router level and then again by so-
phisticated software that blocks selected portions of sites and emails ac-
cording to keyword searches.27
In addition to erecting technological barriers, the PRC regulates
Internet activity through a complex web of local, regional, and national
laws.28 In 1996, the highest authority of state administration, the State
Council, passed the "Interim Provisions Governing the Management of
Computer Information Networks in the People's Republic of China Con-
necting to the International Network, ' 29 marking the PRC's first critical
step toward controlling the Internet.30 Two years later, it passed the
"Provisions for the Implementation of the Interim Provisions Governing
the Management of Computer Information Networks in the People's Re-
public of China," mandating restricted networks and government ap-
proval of Internet service providers (ISPs).
31
23. OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN CHINA IN 2004-2005: A COUNTRY STUDY 4
(2005), available at http://www.opennetinitiative.net/studies/china/ONIChinaCountryStudy.pdf.
24. See Testimony, supra note 11; supra note 10.
25. Testimony, supra note 11.
26. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 6.
27. Jill R. Newbold, Aiding the Enemy: Imposing Liability on U.S. Corporations for Selling
China Internet Tools to Restrict Human Rights, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 503, 511 (2003).
28. OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 23, at 4.
29. Richard Cullen & Pinky D.W. Choy, The Internet in China, 13 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 99, 119
(1999).
30. See id. Article 13 of the Interim Provisions specifically prohibits certain Internet conduct
and content. For example, no individual may use the Internet to engage in criminal activities such as
harming national security or disclosing state secrets. In addition, using the Internet to retrieve, repli-
cate, create, or transmit information that threatens social stability or promotes sexually suggestive
material is prohibited. Id. at 121; Newbold, supra note 27, at 508.
31. Cullen & Choy, supra note 29, at 121.
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Since 1996, content and use regulation has only intensified. In Sep-
tember 2005, the PRC adopted the "Provisions on the Administration of
Internet News Information Services" (News Provisions).32 Article 4 of
the News Provisions creates the legal authority for the government to
supervise news websites.33 Article 19 prohibits reporting positions or
information that the government finds embarrassing or too candid in its
discussion of social problems.34 The News Provisions employ a variety
of control methods, including registration requirements, external gov-
ernment supervision, broad-based content restrictions, and administrative
penalties.35
In 2002, the PRC passed yet another set of regulations, imposing
strict safety standards and requirements for Internet businesses. Owners
of cybercaf6s are now required to install Internet Police 110 software,
which blocks access to more than 500,000 banned websites.36 Moreover,
the government requires ISPs to self-censor their sites or risk being shut
down.37 If an ISP wants to maintain its business license to operate in
China, it is expected to block politically objectionable content.38 The
government, however, refuses to publish an official blacklist of sites and
keywords to be censored.39 Rather, it resorts to vague, far-reaching lan-
guage, prohibiting content that "might harm the state's honor, cause eth-
nic oppression, spread rumors, disrupt social stability, spread pornogra-
phy, undermine state religious policy, or preach the beliefs of evil
cults." 40 The result is that companies are forced to engage in a game of
political mind-reading, intuiting government objections in advance. This
works out well for the PRC; by having private companies assume re-
sponsibility for censorship activities, the government effectively out-
sources the otherwise unmanageable task of monitoring emails, news
stories, blogs, and chat postings.41
III. CORPORATE COMPLICITY
Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo! contend that they have no choice
but to comply with Chinese laws if they are to operate within the




36. Newbold, supra note 27, at 510.
37. Id.
38. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 12.
39. Thompson, supra note 9.
40. Newbold, supra note 27, at 509.
41. Thompson, supra note 9.
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market. 42 Corporate complicity, however, carries a heavy price: the vio-
lation of internationally recognized human rights-most notably, the
right to freedom of expression.
A. Yahoo!
Yahoo! was the first major U.S. Internet company to enter the Chi-
nese market, rolling out a Chinese-language search engine and establish-
ing a Beijing office in 1999.43 Three years later, Yahoo! submitted to
government pressure and signed the "Public Pledge of Self-Discipline
and Professional Ethics for Chinese Internet Industry," which commits
signatories to "energetic efforts to carry forward the rich cultural tradi-
tion of the Chinese nation and the ethical norms of the socialist cultural
civilization" by observing all state industry regulations. 4 In particular,
signatories vow to refrain "from producing, posting, or disseminating
pernicious information that may jeopardize state security and disrupt so-
cial stability. '45 To date, Yahoo! is the only western company known to
have signed the pledge.46
Moreover, the case of Chinese journalist Shi Tao is particularly il-
lustrative of the disturbing consequences of Yahoo!'s complicity in the
Chinese censorship program. In April 2005, business journalist Shi was
sentenced to ten years in prison after using his Yahoo! account to email a
summary of a Chinese Central Propaganda Department communiqu6 to a
pro-democracy website run by Chinese exiles in New York.47 Yahoo!
provided government officials with confidential user information that
was ultimately used to convict Shi of providing state secrets to foreign
entities.48 While this is an extreme example of corporate complicity,
U.S. corporations routinely cave to Chinese government demands and
compromise their users' freedom.
42. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 5, at 23.
43. Press Release, Yahoo!, Yahoo! Introduces Yahoo! China (Sept. 24, 1999),
http://docs.yahoo.com/docs/pr/release389.htm.
44. INTERNET SOC'Y OF CHINA, PUBLIC PLEDGE ON SELF-DISCIPLINE FOR CHINA INTERNET
INDUSTRY, ch. 2, art. 6 (2002), available at http://www.bobsonwong.com/research/china/5/15/ (fol-
low "Public Pledge on Self-Discipline for China Internet Industry" hyperlink).
45. Id.
46. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 12.
47. Thompson, supra note 9.
48. James Heffeman, An American in Beijing: An Attorney's Ethical Considerations Abroad
with a Client Doing Business with a Repressive Government, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 721, 721
(2006).
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B. Microsoft
In 2005, Microsoft launched MSN China,49 and within one month
of the rollout, the company came under fire for censoring. 50  In
particular, MSN China faced intense criticism for shutting own the popu-
lar blog of Zhao Jing, one of China's edgiest and most well-read journal-
ist bloggers.5' Zhao had started using MSN Spaces in August 2005 after
Chinese ISPs blocked his original site. Four months later, Zhao lost his
blog again when Microsoft deleted it at the request of Chinese authori-
ties."
Public outcry and criticism of Microsoft's complicity was so strong
in the United States that by late January 2006, Microsoft decided to alter
its Chinese blog censorship policy. 53 Microsoft has since expressed con-




Like Yahoo! and Microsoft, Google established a physical presence
in China at the turn of the century. 55 By 2004, the company had taken its
first steps in the direction of compromise with Chinese censorship prac-
tices. 56 After launching a Chinese-language edition of Google News, the
company gave the PRC permission to filter certain words and phrases
when users conducted keyword searches.57 Shortly thereafter, Google
49. Press Release, Microsoft, Microsoft Prepares to Launch MSN China (May 11, 2005),
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2005/may05/05- 11 MSNChinaLaunchPR.mspx.
50. Posting of Rebecca MacKinnon to Global Voices,
http://www.globalvoicesonline.org/2005/06/16/screenshots-of-censorship/ (June 16, 2005, 21:32
UTC).
51. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 43. Zhao Jing also writes under the pseudonym
Michael Anti. Id.
52. Id. at 43-44. Apparently, Zhao used his blog to speak out when propaganda authorities
cracked down on Beijing News, a relatively new tabloid with a national reputation for exposing
corruption and official abuse. Id.
53. Id. at 44-45. Today, Microsoft will only remove access to blog content when it receives a
legally binding notice from the government indicating that the material violates local laws. Id. In
addition, Microsoft will remove access to content only in the country issuing the order. Id. Finally,
when local laws require the company to block access to certain content, Microsoft will ensure that
users know why that content was blocked by notifying them that access has been limited due to a
government restriction. Id.
54. Govt. Pressure Needed to Open China's Web, Panel Says, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, Aug.
16, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 14343192 [hereinafter Pressure].
55. Press Release, Google, Google to Open Research and Development Center in China, July
19, 2005, http://www.google.com/press/pressrel/rdchina.html.
56. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 54-55.
57. Id.
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received its license as a Chinese Internet service, and the company be-
58came the censor, not merely the victim of state censorship.
D. Corporate Accountability under
U.S. and International Law
By cooperating with the PRC's censorship efforts, U.S. Internet
companies may violate both domestic and international law. In the
United States, free speech advocates turn to the First Amendment, which
provides, in absolute terms, that "Congress shall make no law... abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the press., 59 Free speech advocates in
Congress argue that this constitutional provision guarantees the right to
communicate "without restriction, including unfettered communication
and association via the Internet., 60 The Framers of the Constitution in-
tended to foreclose government authorities from assuming guardianship
of the public mind by regulating speech.61 As such, freedom of speech is
a fundamental characteristic of a free society.
Of course, there are limits to free speech, even in the United States.
For example, the Communications Decency Act of 1996 is one example
of a federal attempt to regulate Internet content. The act criminalizes the
carriage and transmission of "indecent" materials on the Internet to per-
sons under the age of eighteen.62  The U.S. Supreme Court, however,
requires the government to provide substantial justification for the inter-
ference wherever it attempts to regulate the content of speech. 63 Restric-
tions on speech are the exception to the rule, and freedom of expression
remains a sacred tradition in the United States.
Freedom of speech is also an internationally recognized human
right. In 1948, various nations adopted the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR), committing themselves to the promotion of
freedom of speech and freedom of access to information as fundamental
human rights. 64 Specifically, article 19 of the UDHR provides that
"[e]veryone has the right to ... hold opinions without interference and to
58. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 56. Google.cn filters thousands of keywords and
web addresses. Id.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
60. Global Intemet Freedom Act, H.R. 2216, 109th Cong. § 2(1) (2005).
61. Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 646 F. Supp. 492, 506 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
62. Viktor Mayer-Sch6nberger & Teree E. Foster, A Regulatory Web: Free Speech and the
Global Information Infrastructure, 3 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 45 (1997), available at
http://www.mttlr.org/volthree/foster.html.
63. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)
(laying out a four-part test for determining whether commercial speech is protected by the First
Amendment).
64. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10,
1948).
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seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and
regardless of frontiers. 65 Technically, as a resolution of the United Na-
tions General Assembly (UNGA), rather than a treaty, the UDHR is not
legally binding in its entirety on members of the United Nations. Yet, it
serves as a declaration of basic human rights principles and establishes a
common standard to be achieved by states for all individuals. 66 Courts,
jurists, and states have considered the UDHR as evidence of binding hu-
man rights norms.67
Freedom of speech is also granted unambiguous protection in inter-
national law by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), which is binding on approximately 150 nations.68 By ratifying
the ICCPR, the United States made it binding law under the terms of the
Constitution. 69 China also signed the document and is obliged to uphold
the principles it embodies. 70 Article 19 of the ICCPR provides:
Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right
shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or
in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article
carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be
subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are
provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre
public), or of public health or morals.
71
The freedoms outlined in article 19, however, are not absolute. Ar-
ticle 20 qualifies the right to speak freely, prohibiting the dissemination
65. Id. at art. 19.
66. Newbold, supra note 27, at 522.
67. Id.
68. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, at 52, U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
69. The United States, however, has declared a number of reservations to the ICCPR, princi-
pally that its provisions are not enforceable in federal or state court without implementing legisla-
tion. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IGNORANCE ONLY: HIV/AIDS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND FEDERALLY
FUNDED ABSTINENCE-ONLY PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 41 (2002), available at
http://hrw.org/reports/2002/usa09O2/USA0902.htm#TopOfPage.
70. Testimony, supra note 11.
71. G.A. Res. 2200A, supra note 68, art. 19(3)(a)-(b).
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of war propaganda and any advocacy for national, racial, or religious
hatred that incites violence or discrimination.72
While member states of the United Nations grant formal recogni-
tion to the UDHR and ICCPR, the extent to which free speech is actually
protected varies greatly from state to state. While most Americans view
China's obsession with information control as another manifestation of
communism, China maintains that its censorship policies are necessary to
promote its top priorities: stability and predictability.73 History has
taught the Chinese government that loosening its grip on its citizens
could result in losing the tenuous hold Beijing has over its immense
population. 4 The Chinese are concerned with centralizing authority and
maintaining the prestige of governing officials.75
Despite the PRC's justifications, its censorship program exceeds
the scope of the ICCPR's allowable restrictions.7 6 While the ICCPR
permits a state to restrict speech in order to maintain national security,
public order, and the rights and reputations of others,77 China's Internet
regulations are too expansive to qualify under these limited exceptions.
For example, the government has blacklisted over 200 terms related to
politics or current affairs.78 Among these are phrases which can hardly
qualify as threats to national security, public order, or individual rights,
such as the terms "pollution lawsuit," "horseracing," and "market access
system., 79 By extension, U.S. corporations that provide the technology
to assist in the filtering and blocking of information are complicit in a
clear violation of international law as well.8°
IV. THE GLOBAL ONLINE FREEDOM ACT
AS A BASIS FOR CORPORATE LIABILITY
U.S. technology companies have succumbed to pressure by authori-
tarian governments and have violated standards of corporate responsibil-
ity to protect and uphold human rights.8  According to Representative
Smith, the onus for combating Chinese censorship policies should fall on
U.S. corporations that actively, openly, and deliberately collaborate with
72. Id. at art. 20.
73. Thompson, supra note 9.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Newbold, supra note 27, at 521.
77. G.A. Res. 2200A, supra note 68, art. 19(3)(a)-(b).
78. Keywords Used to Filter Web Content, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2006, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/18/AR2006021800554.html.
79. Id.
80. Testimony, supra note 11.
81. Id.
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the Chinese government. 82 In January 2007, he re-introduced the Act,
which is intended to "promote freedom of expression on the Internet"
and to "protect United States businesses from coercion to participate in
repression by authoritarian foreign governments.,
83
To promote freedom of expression on the Internet, the Act proposes
that it shall be the policy of the United States
to promote as a fundamental component of United States foreign
policy the right of everyone to freedom of opinion and expression,
including the freedom to hold opinions without interference and to
seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media
and regardless of frontiers;
to use all appropriate instruments of United States influence, includ-
ing diplomacy, trade policy, and export controls, to support, pro-
mote, and strengthen principles, practices, and values that promote
the free flow of information, including through the Internet and
other electronic media; and
to deter any United States business from cooperating with officials
of Internet-restricting countries in effecting the political censorship
of online content.
84
To realize these objectives, drafters of the Act recommend that the
President seek out international agreements to promote Internet freedom
on a global scale.85 The Act further provides for annual reporting on the
availability of Internet access and an assessment of the extent to which
government authorities attempt to filter, censor, or otherwise block Inter-
net content.86
In addition, the Act establishes the Office of Global Internet Free-
dom (the Office) as part of the Department of State to serve as the focal
point for interagency efforts to promote freedom of electronic informa-
tion.87 The Office will: (1) develop a global strategy to combat state-
sponsored Internet censorship; (2) identify and publicize keywords and
phrases filtered by Internet-restricting countries; (3) work with human
rights organizations and experts to develop a voluntary code of minimum
82. The Internet in China: A Tool for Freedom or Suppression?: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations of the H. Comm. on International
Relations, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Rep. Christopher Smith, Chairman, H. International
Relations Subcomm. on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations).
83. Global Internet Freedom Act, H.R. 2216, 109th Cong. (2005).
84. Global Online Freedom Act of 2007, H.R. 275, 110th Cong. § 101 (2007).
85. Id. § 102(1).
86. Id. § 103(a).
87. Id. § 104.
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corporate standards; and (4) advise congressional committees of neces-
88sary legislative action.
The bill also establishes minimum corporate standards for online
freedom. Pursuant to the Act, Internet companies will be required to dis-
close the terms they filter and the rules they must observe in Internet-
restricting countries.89 Companies will also be barred from providing
foreign governments with information that personally identifies a user,
except for legitimate law enforcement purposes. 90 Finally, the Act pro-
hibits companies from blocking or removing online content of U.S. gov-
ernment sites or government-financed sites.9' Violations of the Act can
result in both civil and criminal liability with maximum penalties of
$2,000,000 or imprisonment for up to five years.92 By imposing liability
on Internet corporations, the United States can send a powerful message
to the PRC, signaling its refusal to play a part in the denial of essential
freedoms.93
V. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. LAW
Despite its good intentions, the Act risks exporting specifically
American notions of free speech beyond U.S. borders. By attempting to
regulate the activities of American businesses in Internet-restricting
countries, the Act effectively extends the jurisdiction of U.S. courts be-
yond the nation's boundaries and into the territories of sovereign states.
The term "extraterritoriality" refers to the act by which a state cre-
ates legislation regarding "the rights and obligations of its citizens with
regard to transactions occurring beyond its boundaries. 94  American
courts have long abided by a presumption against extraterritoriality,
seeking to avoid unintended clashes between domestic and foreign laws
which could lead to international discord.95 Almost a century ago, in
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., the U.S. Supreme Court re-
fused to apply the Sherman Antitrust Act to a dispute involving two ba-
nana exporters in Panama, one of whom was an American citizen. 96 The
88. Id § 104(b).
89. Frank Davies, Internet Giants Pressured to Stop Censoring Overseas Content, CONTRA
COSTA TIMES, July 22, 2006, at F4, available at 2006 WLNR 12615908.
90. Id.
91. Id
92. H.R. 275 § 206(a)-(b).
93. Newbold, supra note 27, at 517.
94. Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 320 N.W.2d 843, 854 (Mich. 1982) (quoting 73 AM.
JUR. 2D Statutes § 357 (1974)).
95. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (citing MeCulloch v. So-
ciedad Nacional de Marineros de Hond., 372 U.S. 10, 20-22 (1963); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S.
281, 285 (1949)).
96. 213 U.S. 347, 359 (1909).
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Court noted that "the general and almost universal rule is that the charac-
ter of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law
of the country where the act is done." 97 Given today's increasingly in-
ternational order, however, courts have shifted away from a strictly terri-
torial approach toward jurisdiction, recognizing particular state interests
that may justify the application of domestic laws in a foreign jurisdiction.
In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, the court recog-
nized three exceptions to the presumption against extraterritoriality.98
First, the presumption gives way when there is a clear and affirmative
intention of Congress to extend the scope of the legislation to conduct
occurring within other sovereign nations. 99 Second, domestic laws may
be applied in a foreign setting if a failure to do so would result in adverse
effects within the United States. 100 Known as the "substantial effects"
test, courts have routinely held that U.S. laws can be applied extraterrito-
rially whenever conduct is intended to, and actually does, cause "sub-
stantial effects" within the United States.101 The third exception arises
where the conduct Congress seeks to regulate occurs largely within the
United States. 102 With regard to the Act, the latter two exceptions to the
presumption against extraterritoriality are inapplicable; Internet censor-
ship in the PRC has no real adverse effect within the United States, nor
does the Act seek to regulate activity within the nation's borders. There-
fore, the sole justification for applying U.S. law in China rests on the
affirmative intention of Congress to enforce its laws abroad. Whether
Congress has in fact exercised this authority is a matter of statutory con-
struction. 
103
In the seminal case Foley Bros. v. Filardo, the Court analyzed Con-
gress's intent to legislate extraterritorially in light of three key considera-
tions: (1) whether the language of the statute in question provided any
indication that Congress intended to apply the statute extraterritorially;
(2) whether the legislative history evinced congressional intent to apply
the statute extraterritorially; and (3) whether the relevant administrative
interpretations of the statute illustrated congressional intent to extend the
statute's reach.
10 4
97. Id. at 356.
98. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
99. Arabian, 499 U.S. at 248 (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138,
147 (1957)).
100. Massey, 986 F.2d at 531; see also Maxwell Commc'n Corp. plc v. Societe Generale (In re
Maxwell Commc'n Corp. plc), 93 F.3d 1036, 1052 (2d Cir.1996).
101. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 925 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (citing United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945)).
102. See Maxwell, 93 F.3d at 1048; Massey, 986 F.2d at 531.
103. Arabian, 499 U.S. at 247 (citing Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1949)).
104. 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
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Later, in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., the Court concluded
that unless a statute clearly expresses an affirmative intent to legislate
extraterritorially, courts must presume that Congress was primarily con-
cerned with domestic conditions.10 5 Interestingly, Arabian did not over-
rule Foley Bros., so courts continue to look beyond the language of the
statute for indicia of congressional intent. 0 6
With respect to the Act, there is undeniable congressional intent to
regulate activity in a foreign jurisdiction. The express purposes of the
Act are to prevent U.S. businesses from cooperating with repressive for-
eign governments and to regulate the conduct of these companies on an
international scale. 0 7 The language unambiguously expresses this inten-
tion and is sufficient to overcome the presumption against extraterritori-
ality. 10
8
While congressional intent is the ultimate touchstone of the extra-
territoriality analysis, courts have recently tempered the application of
U.S. laws in foreign jurisdictions with considerations of comity, 10 9 which
refers to the respect one sovereign nation affords another by limiting the
reach of its laws." 0 Over a century ago, the Court stated that comity
is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of
mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recogni-
tion which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative,
executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both
to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own
citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its
laws.'HI
At its core, comity recognizes that there are circumstances in which the
application of foreign law may be more appropriate than that of domestic
105. 499 U.S. 244, 247 (1991); accord Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc'ns Co., 24 F.3d
1088, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 1994); Van Blaricom v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 17 F.3d 1224, 1225 (9th
Cir. 1994); Labor Union of Pico Korea, Ltd. v. Pico Prods., Inc., 968 F.2d 191, 194 (2d Cir. 1992).
106. ACLU v. Gonzales, 478 F.Supp. 2d 775, 811 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (reviewing legislative his-
tory of statute to determine its extraterritorial applicability); see also Small v. United States, 544
U.S. 385, 390-91 (2005) (assuming congressional intent is that a statute should apply domestically
only, unless statutory language, context, history, or purpose establish otherwise).
107. Global Online Freedom Act of 2007, H.R. 275, 110th Cong. § 101(2)-(3) (2007).
108. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (presumption
against extraterritoriality does not apply where there is an affirmative, clearly expressed intention of
Congress to extend the scope of the statute).
109. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797-99 (1993) (noting that
comity either may be relevant in determining whether a court should decline to exercise jurisdiction
or may be used as a tool for initially ascertaining the scope of jurisdiction); Maxwell Commc'n
Corp. plc v. Societe Generale (In re Maxwell Commc'n Corp. plc), 93 F.3d 1036, 1047 (2d
Cir.1996).
110. Maxwell, 93 F.3d at 1046.
111. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
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law. 112  Thus, even when Congress has the authority to legislate and
apply its laws extraterritorially, statutes regulating foreign persons or
conduct should be interpreted, if possible, to avoid conflict with foreign
law.
1 3
In the event of a conflict of law, U.S. courts rely on a standard of
reasonableness, as set forth in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States, when determining whether to forego the
application of domestic law due to principles of comity. 114 This reason-
ableness inquiry turns on a number of nonexclusive factors, including
the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or
has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the terri-
tory;
the connections . . . between the regulating state and the person
principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between
that state and those whom the regulation is designed to protect;
the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regu-
lation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regu-
late such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such
regulation is generally accepted[;]
the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or
hurt by the regulation;
the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal,
or economic system;
the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of
the international system;
the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating
the activity; and
the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.115
While this approach has been criticized for its lack of predictability and
inherent tendency to overvalue domestic interests, 116 the Restatement
112. French v. Liebmann (In re French), 440 F.3d 145, 153 (4th Cir. 2006).
113. See Maxwell, 93 F.3d at 1047.
114. French, 440 F.3d at 153; see also Hartford, 509 U.S. at 799; Maxwell, 93 F.3d at 1048.
115. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403
(1987).
116. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 948-49 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
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factors provide a workable framework for a comprehensive assessment
of the competing interests at play.
With regard to the Act, several of the Restatement factors weigh
heavily in support of Congress's attempt to regulate U.S. companies op-
erating in Internet-restricting countries. First, a substantial connection
exists between the regulating state and the person principally responsible
for the activity. Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo! are citizens of the
United States, and as a result, they fall under the protections and limita-
tions of U.S. law. Second, the importance of the regulation to the regu-
lating country favors extraterritorial application. U.S. citizens value free-
dom of speech as much as, if not more than, nearly any other freedom
enumerated in the Constitution. In fact, our Constitution provides the
broadest protection for rights of expression known to the civilized world.
As a signatory of both the UDHR and ICCPR, the United States further
demonstrates its commitment to promoting and protecting notions of free
speech around the world. Third, the Act is consistent with norms of in-
ternational law, as evidenced by the broad acceptance and ratification of
the UDHR and ICCPR. Both the UDHR and the ICCPR represent a
widespread renunciation of illegitimate restrictions on speech and access
to information." 17
There are, however, numerous factors which tip the scales against
the extraterritorial application of First Amendment protections. First, the
extent to which the censorship activity takes place within, or has effects
on, the regulating state is very limited. The Act regulates Internet cen-
sorship and surveillance activities that occur within the PRC. Practically
speaking, then, the regulated conduct has little effect on Internet users in
the United States.
Second, there is a justified expectation that China, as a sovereign
nation, should be able to devise its own policies regarding Internet use
without interference from foreign states. The PRC has legislated exten-
sively on the issue, and while the United States may not approve of Chi-
nese laws, a certain degree of deference should nonetheless be given,
based on China's sovereignty.
Third, the risk of conflict between foreign and domestic laws is
practically certain. Finally, while the Act is seemingly consistent with
the traditions of the international system, it actually imposes American
standards of free speech on foreign countries, not internationally con-
strued norms. Section 105(a) of the Act gives the U.S. President the
broad authority to designate countries as "Internet-restricting," according
to his or her own determinations of a country's systematic pattern of
117. Newbold, supra note 27, at 522.
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restrictions on Internet freedom. 18  The Act requires further that the
President submit an annual report to appropriate congressional commit-
tees that identifies government agencies responsible for "substantial"
restrictions on Internet freedom." 9 Determinations under the Act of
what constitutes "substantial" are undoubtedly impacted by cultural bi-
ases and implicate an American view of freedom of expression.
Given the complexity of this reasonableness analysis, it is difficult
to predict whether a court would find a justified basis for regulating Chi-
nese Internet censorship vis-d-vis domestic law. Recent decisions by
U.S. courts, however, reveal a reluctance to export First Amendment pro-
tections to extraterritorial activities.
In 2000, L'Union des Etudiants Juifs de France (The Union of
French Jewish Students) (UEJF) and La Ligue Contre La Racisme Et
L'Antisemitisme (The Anti-Racism and Anti-Semitism League)
(LICRA) sued Yahoo! in France.' 20 The plaintiffs alleged that Yahoo!
violated French law by hosting Nazi memorabilia on its auction site. 121
The plaintiffs obtained a judgment ordering Yahoo! to take certain meas-
ures to restrict access or remove the merchandise from the site.122 A
failure to do so would have resulted in significant fines for the U.S.
Internet company.
Yahoo! complied with the French court's order but commenced an
action in U.S. district court seeking declaratory relief, on the ground that
the French order infringed upon its First Amendment rights. 123 The dis-
trict court held that the French order did, in fact, chill speech and contra-
vene U.S. public policy. 124  In order to preserve the company's First
Amendment rights, the court granted Yahoo!'s motion for declaratory
relief. 
25
UEFJ and LICRA immediately appealed the district court deci-
sion.126  In Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et
L 'Antisemitisme, the Ninth Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals reversed
118. Global Online Freedom Act of 2007, H.R. 275, 110th Cong. § 105(a)(l) (2007).
119. Id. § 105(a)(2).
120. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1202
(9th Cir. 2006).
121. Lyombe Eko, New Medium, Old Free Speech Regimes: The Historical and Ideological
Foundations of French & American Regulation of Bias-Motivated Speech and Symbolic Expression
on the Internet, 28 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 69, 72 (2006). French law prohibits the dis-
semination of racist and anti-Semitic material. Id.
122. 9th Circuit Reverses in Yahoo v. LICRA, TECH L.J., Aug. 23, 2004,
http://www.techlawjoumal.com/topstories/2004/20040823.asp [hereinafter 9th Circuit].
123. Eko, supra note 121, at 73.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 74.
126. Id
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and remanded, holding that the district court lacked personal jurisdic-
tion.127 The Ninth Circuit maintained that Yahoo! was obliged to wait
for UEFJ and LICRA to initiate U.S. proceedings to enforce the French
judgment before raising its First Amendment defense.1 28  The court's
ruling was essentially procedural, thus failing to resolve Yahoo!'s First
Amendment claims.129  The decision, however, implicitly accepts the
foreign judgment in spite of U.S. laws. 130 In essence, the decision sub-
jects Yahoo! to the speech restrictions of French law despite the legal
protections afforded it under the First Amendment. 131
Yahoo! is significant because it leaves the First Amendment issue
largely unresolved. 32 The Ninth Circuit was presented with an opportu-
nity to determine the extent of First Amendment protections for U.S.
Internet companies operating in foreign jurisdictions. Unfortunately, the
court skirted the constitutional issue, focusing instead on the procedural
roadblocks. 133 The issue will undoubtedly reappear before U.S. courts,
perhaps in the context of the Act. Despite the absence of clear precedent,
there are several policy arguments that weigh against the Act and its ex-
traterritorial application of First Amendment rights.
VI. POLICY ARGUMENTS AGAINST APPLYING
THE ACT EXTRATERRITORIALLY
A Unilateral, American-Centric Approach to Global
Internet Regulation Disregards the Sovereignty, History,
and Cultural Norms of Foreign Nations
Although free speech is an internationally recognized human
right, 34 it is not a right without limits. A degree of permissible censor-
ship exists,135 and restrictions on speech are often shaped by the unique
127. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1209
(9th Cir. 2006).
128. Id.
129. Eko, supra note 121, at 78.
130. Heather Maly, Publish at Your Own Risk or Don't Publish at All: Forum Shopping Trends
in Libel Litigation Leave the First Amendment Un-guaranteed, 14 J.L. & POL'Y 883, 921 (2006).
131. Id.




133. Andrew M. Pickett, Much Yahoo! About Nothing: The Ninth Circuit, Jurisprudential
Schizophrenia, and the Road Not Taken in Yahoo! v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et
L'Antis~mitisme, 8 TULANE J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 231, 242 (2006).
134. See supra notes 64, 68 and accompanying text.
135. Newbold, supra note 27, at 527.
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history, philosophy, and culture of a sovereign nation. For example, in
the aftermath of the Holocaust, Germany and France established draco-
nian laws criminalizing hate speech. 36 Section 86 of Germany's Crimi-
nal Code, for instance, forbids the distribution of propaganda that pro-
motes (1) the precepts of the Nazi regime, (2) unconstitutional parties, or
(3) prohibited associations. 37 Sections 130 and 131 outlaw writings that
"incite to race hatred or which describe cruel or other inhuman acts of
violence .. . in a manner injuring human dignity ... ." ,38 Similarly,
French law prohibits public speech or writings that incite racial or reli-
gious hatred, as well as those that deny the Holocaust. 
139
In addition, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
provides that restrictions on speech may be prescribed by law and are
necessary in a democratic society. 140  Specifically, article 10 provides
that free speech may be restricted
in the interest of national security, territorial integrity or public
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of
others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in con-
fidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the ju-
diciary.
141
Even in the United States, free speech is not an absolute right. 142 The
First Amendment does not protect libelous statements, false cries of fire
in a crowded theater, fighting words, or obscenities. 143  Other types of
speech are guaranteed only limited protection under the First Amend-
ment, including commercial speech and speech mixed with conduct.
144
The question of what constitutes permissible speech is left largely
in the hands of each sovereign nation. Under the Act, however, the
United States effectively usurps this authority from sovereign states and
dictates the boundaries of protected speech. The Act gives the President
unquestioned authority to label nations as "Intemet-restricting," a deter-
mination that requires the President to draw a line between permissible
136. Mayer-Sch6nberger & Foster, supra note 62, at 48 nn. 13-15.
137. Id. at49.
138. Id. at48 n.15.
139. See 9th Circuit, supra note 122.
140. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 10(2), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm.
141. Id.
142. See generally Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002); Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
143. Michael Bimhack, The Copyright Law and Free Speech Affair: Making-up and Breaking-
up, 43 IDEA 233, 259 (2003).
144. Id.
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and non-permissible censorship. 145 As a result, the Act facilitates the de
facto exportation of American free speech standards to the rest of the
world.
146
B. The Act May Produce Unintended Spillover Effects That
Interfere with the Laws of Democratic Countries
Exporting American notions of free speech will likely have unex-
pected and perhaps undesirable impacts in those countries that do not
share the same far-reaching free speech protections. For example, as
discussed above, Germany and France both restrict certain forms of hate
speech for legitimate and historic purposes. 14  This proposed one-size-
fits-all policy fashioned by the United States is, therefore, not a practical
or respectful approach to combating Internet censorship.
C. Increased Government Regulation
of the Internet Is Problematic
The Act represents a dangerous step towards government regulation
of search engine operations. 148 While the Act was designed to safeguard
free speech and access to information, it actually empowers the U.S.
government to regulate content on the Internet. The Act would require
U.S. Internet companies to provide the Office with: (1) all terms and
parameters used to filter, limit, or otherwise affect the results provided
by the search engine; 149 and (2) the Uniform Resource Locators (URLs)
of all data and content that such businesses have removed from the con-
tent hosting service or blocked from the Internet.1 50 These provisions
contradict a crucial objective of the First Amendment: to prevent gov-
ernment interference with speech.1 51
D. The Act Imposes Significant Economic Consequences for Internet
Companies While Having Little Effect on the Chinese Government
From an economic standpoint, the propriety of the Act should be
questioned. Imposing liability on Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo! will
have an insignificant impact on the PRC, but it will carry serious ramifi-
cations for U.S. Internet companies.
145. Global Online Freedom Act of 2006, H.R. 4780, 109th Cong. § 105(a) (2006).
146. Law and Information, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ugasser/2006/02/16 (Feb. 16, 2006,
10:29 EST).
147. Mayer-Sch6nberger & Foster, supra note 62, at 48 nn.13-15.
148. Eric Goldman, Technology & Marketing Law Blog,
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2006/03/congress is lov.htm (Mar, 6, 2006, 18:39 PST).
149. Global Online Freedom Act of 2007, H.R. 275, 110th Cong. § 203 (2007).
150. Id. § 204.
151. Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 646 F. Supp. 492, 506 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
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China now has more than 130 million Internet users, more than any
country other than the United States. 5 2 The far-reaching language of the
Act presents a huge competitive disadvantage for U.S. companies, who
will be cut out of the market for failing to comply with China's censor-
ship policies. 153 Already, a Chinese competitor, Baidu, has gained mar-
ket share and is now the preeminent website in China,' 54 all the while
complying with strict PRC censorship policies.1 55 If U.S. companies are
forced to comply with the Act, Baidu and other Chinese Internet compa-
nies will continue to prosper with no detriment to the Chinese govern-
ment.
E. The Act Will Harm Chinese Internet Users
One must not overlook the impact of the Act on the very group it
seeks to protect: Chinese Internet users. The higher standards imposed
on Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo! place the companies at risk of losing
their licenses to operate in China, ultimately resulting in less online free-
dom for Chinese Internet users. 56 Freedom of expression for Internet
users around the world is a noble goal; imposing liability on U.S. com-
panies alone, however, is not the best approach to securing this freedom.
It is unrealistic to assume that Internet-restricting countries will change
their policies because U.S. businesses might incur liability. 5 7 Instead of
merely imposing higher standards on U.S. companies, the development
of a uniform, industry-wide code of conduct would better serve free
speech.
VII. INDUSTRY-WIDE CODE OF CONDUCT
AS AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION
Given the problems with imposing restrictions only on U.S. Internet
companies, concerted and collective action by Internet companies around
the world would prove a more effective means of withstanding Chinese
government pressure. Speech restrictions on the Internet must be elvated
152. David Barboza, The Rise of Baidu (That's Chinese for Google),
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2006, § 3, at 31, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/17/business/yourmoney/1 7baidu.html.
153. George, supra note 22.
154. Barboza, supra note 152.
155. Goldman, supra note 148. In 2006, Baidu held a 44% revenue market share, while Yahoo
had 21.1% and Google only took 13.2%. China Report: U.S. Tech Desired, but Still Forbidden,
TECHWEBNEWS, June 21, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 10751368. Baidu has a market value of
$3 billion and operates the fourth-most-trafficked website in the world. Barboza, supra note 152.
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to the international level to be both subjectively acceptable and globally
enforceable.
158
Several examples of international attempts to regulate the Internet
already exist. 159 For example, the Berne Convention oversees interna-
tional copyright protection, and the Hague Convention is attempting to
resolve uncertainty in online contracts through Internet jurisdiction. 160 A
unilateral attempt by the United States to combat Internet censorship
would discredit these efforts and likely offend fellow U.N. member
states. The U.S. government has a long-term interest in both being a co-
operative member of an international system and sharing in its reciprocal
benefits and burdens.
161
Since the February 2006 congressional hearing, a working group,
composed of academics from the Berkeley China Internet Project of the
Graduate School of Journalism at the University of California at Berke-
ley, the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
and the Oxford Internet Institute at Oxford University, has begun to draft
a globally applicable corporate code of conduct.' 62 The Center for De-
mocracy and Technology is also facilitating discussions about a code of
conduct between academics, think tanks, and representatives from the
Internet companies themselves.1
63
In order to develop an industry-wide code of conduct, Internet
companies must first identify the substantive categories of speech to be
regulated. 64 An answer to this question should be reached by global
consensus to circumvent charges of national interests and to stimulate
cross-cultural exchange.165 While information-related values are culture
specific, there are certain core values to which the international commu-
nity subscribes, including informational autonomy, diversity, and qual-
ity.
166
158. Mayer-Schdnberger & Foster, supra note 62.
159. Julie L. Henn, Targeting Transnational Internet Content Regulation, 21 B.U. INT'L L.J.
157, 164 (2003).
160. Maly, supra note 130, at 930.
161. Graeme W. Austin, Importing Kazaa-Exporting Grokster, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 577, 596 (2006).
162. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 73.
163. Id. at 73.
164. Mayer-Schdnberger & Foster, supra note 62, at 60.
165. Id. at 57.
166. Law and Information, supra note 146.
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Beyond identifying substantive content to be regulated, a voluntary
code should also bind Internet companies to the following terms:
No user data should be stored in jurisdictions where there is a strong
record of punishing individuals for exercising basic rights such as
freedom of expression;
Companies should not take on the role of active censors;
Companies should be prohibited from complying with oral, un-
documented requests from the authorities for censorship of political
speech;
Companies should make public on their websites when a govern-
ment has forced them to censor political speech; and
When a search returns no results, or only censored results, compa-
nies should be required to clearly inform users.1
6 7
These standards and practices should transcend the relationship of indi-
vidual companies to any given market, therefore collectively strengthen-
ing the entire industry. 68 In addition, these standards serve not only as a
catalyst for corporate responsibility, but also as a buffer for companies
operating in a political environment where freedom of expression is re-
stricted. 169 This corporate code of conduct will enable companies all
over the world to serve the interests and rights of their users and to avoid
being used by governments as tools for political manipulation.
170
Critics argue, however, that Internet companies are unlikely to sign
on to a voluntary code, particularly in a competitive industry where non-
compliance could lead to huge market gains.1 ' Despite this possibility,
there are numerous incentives for companies to jump on board.
First, political censorship of the Internet degrades the quality of
ISPs' service and threatens the integrity and viability of the industry it-
self, both in the United States and abroad. 172 Second, an industry-wide
code would level the playing field and enable Internet companies to re-
sist caving to Chinese demands without losing Chinese market share.
7 3
Companies are likely to welcome standards by which they can conduct
167. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 78-80.
168. Id. at 73.
169. Id
170. China: Internet Companies Aid Censorship, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Aug. 10, 2006,
available at http://hrw.org/english/does/2006/08/09/china13940.htm.
171. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 77.
172. Global Online Freedom Act of 2007, H.R. 275, 110th Cong. § 2(6) (2007).
173. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 77.
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business with authoritarian foreign governments while safeguarding hu-
man rights.1 74 Even Chinese Internet companies that willingly comply
with strict censorship policies could stand to benefit from an industry-
wide code of conduct. Various incentives could be offered to participat-
ing entities, such as access to new markets and increased corporate
goodwill.
Third, there have been numerous indications of support from the
Internet companies themselves. Microsoft has been very vocal on the
issue and is "deeply concerned about issues of individual security and
government control of Internet content."' 7 5 Similarly, Yahoo! claims to
condemn punishment of any activity recognized as free speech and has
made its view "clearly known" to China.1 76 Yahoo! is working to pre-
serve the Internet's openness worldwide, through discussions with gov-
ernment, industry, academia, and nongovernmental bodies over policies
guiding industry practices.
1 77
Finally, repressive governments cannot exercise full control over
the Internet without the willing cooperation of the private sector compa-
nies that lead the industry. 78 Changing Chinese government policies
will be difficult, but if companies put up a united front and are supported
by the international community, they will be in a very strong position. In
1999, for example, technology companies stood up to the Chinese gov-
ernment when it tried to clamp down on the commercial use of cryptog-
raphy to maintain the confidentiality of corporate communications.
179
Coordinated efforts by various companies and trade agencies forced the
Chinese government to drop its demand that encryption codes be turned
over. 180
For the reasons enumerated above, an industry-wide code of con-
duct is a better alternative to legislation that imposes a heavy burden on
U.S. Internet companies alone. A concerted global effort is a more le-
gitimate and effective means of withstanding China's censorship poli-
cies.
174. Davies, supra note 89.
175. Pressure, supra note 54.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Technology should encourage and empower the oppressed, not
serve as a tool of repression.'8 1 In this respect, the Act is a commendable
attempt to impose a higher standard of ethical business practices on U.S.
corporations operating in China. The Act, however, applies domestic
standards of free speech extraterritorially, imposing American values and
standards on nations with very different political ideologies. The fight
against Internet censorship would be better served by the development
and implementation of a global, industry-wide code of conduct which
takes diverse national values into account and holds all Internet compa-
nies to the same standard.
181. Chris Smith, Op-Ed, Do No (Online) Evil, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2006, available at
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/nj04_smith/opedgofa.html.
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